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November 19 2026

Corroboration in Scots law – what remains of the safeguard?

Scott Jenkins Comment, News

Corroboration, at least in theory, remains a uniquely Scottish but important protection for accused people. The essence of the principle of corroboration is that the accused may not be convicted on the evidence of a single witness.

In Scots Law, no person can be convicted of a crime or a statutory offence, except where the Legislature otherwise directs, unless there is evidence of at least two witnesses implicating the person accused with the commission of the crime or offence with which he is charged. (Morton v HM Advocate [1938] JC 50, per Lord Justice Clerk Aitchison)

Each essential or crucial fact that is required to be proved by the prosecution, must be corroborated by another piece of evidence.  Generally, the two crucial facts which must be proved in every crime are that the offence was truly committed and that it was the accused who committed the crime.

When it has suited the Courts, they have pointed to the requirement of corroboration as sufficient protection for the individual necessary to overcome the imbalances that occur due to the inequality of arms of the individual against the state prosecuting.  For example, when a simple majority previously could convict in a jury of fifteen, unlike in England where a qualified majority was always necessary, but corroboration was not required.

Prior to the famous leading case of Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 – a landmark decision that held that detaining suspects in Scotland for questioning without prior access to a solicitor violated their right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights – corroboration was held up as a protection against the practice of police interviewing accused people without access to legal advice.

However, one year later, in 2011 from the same pool of Scottish judges the Carloway Review into the requirement of corroboration concluded that it is an archaic rule and an “impediment to justice”. It is this sentiment that has provailed in all developments of the law to come.

For the past ten years or more, MOJO has sought to bring to the attention of our user group, our student volunteers and anyone who will listen that the systematic chipping away at the requirement for corroboration (as well as other essential protections for accused people) is a dangerous notion that will lead to more miscarriages of justice, rather than fewer.

Today, we reproduce in full, from Scottish Legal News an article by Mr Neil MacDonald taking a measured approach to recent developments in the law.  The original piece in Scottish Legal News can be found HERE.  Mr MacDonald is senior associate at Brodies LLP.

Neil Macdonald: Corroboration in Scots law – what remains of the safeguard?

Scots criminal law has long prided itself on a distinctive safeguard: no one should be convicted on the testimony of a single witness alone. Rooted in the writings of Baron Hume, corroboration was intended to protect against the fallibility of human testimony and the potentially devastating consequences of wrongful conviction.

Recent decisions of the High Court of Justiciary have fundamentally changed how that safeguard operates. Following Lord Advocate’s References Nos 1, 2 and 3 of 2023, and most recently HM Advocate v PK [2026] HCJAC 42, the question is whether corroboration remains a meaningful safeguard against wrongful conviction or has become a matter of form rather than substance – concerned only with the number of sources rather than with what they actually prove.

What did the courts decide?

In Lord Advocate’s Reference No 1 of 2023 [2023] HCJAC 40, the court rejected the requirement that each essential element of an offence must be corroborated separately. It overruled Smith v Lees 1997 JC 73 and Cinci v HM Advocate 2004 JC 103, holding that the evidence should be considered as a whole.

The court also confirmed that evidence of a complainer’s distress, together with statements made in the immediate aftermath of an alleged offence, could corroborate the complainer’s account of the crime, rather than being restricted to corroborating a particular element such as absence of consent.

Lord Advocate’s References Nos 2 and 3 of 2023 [2024] HCJAC 43 extended that approach. The court held that a de recenti statement could provide corroboration even where there was no accompanying evidence of distress. Such a statement could, in appropriate circumstances, corroborate both the commission of the crime and the identification of the accused.

The most recent decision, HM Advocate v PK [2026] HCJAC 42, went further in clarifying the consequences of the new approach. The court held that forensic evidence establishing penetration could corroborate an allegation of rape even where the accused accepted intercourse but maintained that it was consensual.

The reasoning was that corroborative evidence need not independently establish the criminality of the conduct. It can be equally consistent with innocence when considered in isolation, provided that it supports the complainer’s account when considered alongside the evidence as a whole.

The formal rule remains: two sources of evidence are required to establish the crime and the accused’s responsibility. But what those sources must actually establish has changed considerably.

Two sources of evidence, but how much independent support?

This is where I believe the real difficulty lies.

If we consider a de recenti statement in a case involving an allegation of rape. Shortly after the alleged incident the complainer tells a friend that she has been raped. The friend gives evidence of that conversation.

There are two witnesses, but only one original source of the allegation that rape occurred. The friend did not witness the intercourse and cannot independently establish whether it was consensual. The statement may strengthen the complainer’s credibility, but does it provide independent confirmation that the crime was committed?

The same difficulty arises with DNA evidence.

Where an accused accepts sexual intercourse but disputes consent, DNA may reliably establish penetration and identity. It does not establish whether the intercourse was consensual. Yet, following PK, that evidence may provide the necessary corroboration for the allegation of rape.

The issue is not whether the evidence is reliable. It may be scientifically impeccable. The issue is what it actually proves.

In both situations, the corroboration requirement can be satisfied even though the second source does not independently support the conclusion that a crime was committed.

Corroboration begins to look less like a requirement for independent support for guilt and more like a requirement for two sources of evidence which, when combined, fit the prosecution case.

That is a significant change.

What happened to Hume’s principle?

Hume’s underlying concern was straightforward: even an apparently credible and reliable witness can be wrong. The consequences of criminal conviction are sufficiently serious that the law should not permit a single person’s testimony, however convincing, to determine guilt without independent evidential support.

Hume’s rationale was that it was better for a guilty person to escape punishment than for an innocent person to be convicted.

The recent decisions do not formally abandon that principle. The presumption of innocence remains, and guilt must still be established beyond reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless, they have removed an evidential restriction which previously prevented conviction in certain circumstances where an essential element lacked independent corroboration.

That creates a legitimate concern about increasing the risk of wrongful convictions.

The standard of proof and corroboration serve different purposes. The former determines how sure a jury must be before convicting. The latter determines whether the prosecution has the necessary evidential foundation for conviction in the first place.

A jury may be entirely convinced by one witness, particularly where other evidence appears consistent with that witness’s account. Corroboration was intended to provide an additional safeguard against the possibility that the central account, however persuasive, might be wrong.

If evidence which does not independently support the disputed criminality can satisfy corroboration, what meaningful additional protection does the requirement provide?

Conclusion

I am not suggesting that the old law was perfect. In my view it could be overly restrictive and create significant difficulties for the prosecution, particularly in relation to sexual offences. I am not necessarily opposed to an approach under which the case as a whole must be corroborated, rather than each essential element separately.

For me, however, that should require evidence from two independent sources that both point towards guilt – not simply evidence that is consistent with the allegation.

My principal concern is that the recent judgments may increase the risk of wrongful conviction by removing the substance of a vital safeguard. That concern cannot be considered in isolation from the majority required to convict.

In Scotland, a conviction can now be returned by 10 of 15 jurors, leaving five unconvinced of guilt. By contrast, In England and Wales where there is no requirement for corroboration, juries are initially required to reach unanimity, with a majority of at least ten of 12 permitted only if the judge allows it.

In my view, this requires Parliament’s attention. If corroboration no longer provides the protection it once did, then Parliament should consider whether the remaining safeguards – including the majority required for conviction – are sufficient. A protection of this importance should not be substantially diminished without a wider assessment of the risk of convicting the innocent.

Neil Macdonald is a senior associate at Brodies LLP

Mr Macdonald’s orginal article can be found HERE.

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